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Article 6

JOINDER OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RELIEF
IN INDIANA
Among the long enduring and still unsatisfied criticisms
of the administration of justice, a leading place is held by
complaints concerning delays, expense, and inconvenience.
"When the lawyer refuses to act intelligently, unintelligent
application of the legislative steamroller by the layman is
the alternative." 1 Quasi-judicial powers, for individuals
and administrative boards, have arisen as monuments to ineffective judicial processes. If members of the bar desire
to retain the administration of justice within the confines of
judicial tribunals, it behooves them to seek a remedy for
excessive expense and delays within and not without the
judicial system.
Today it is a postulate of common acceptance in the
United States that offenses against society and offenses
against private interests are litigated quite separately, and
never in the same proceeding. When a certain act or transaction involves a violation of both public interests and private interests, a proceeding on behalf of society is had fairly
promptly in the criminal courts; after considerable delay,
the same incident is aired once more before the civil courts.
No consideration is given to the great expense and delay suffered by the civil complainant, and the duplicate sacrifices of
time and money extracted from disinterested witnesses. The
criminal proceeding alone may require the attendance of
witnesses for as many as three hearings,-grand jury, preliminary, and petit jury. Then months or years later they
must appear again for a civil trial in which they relate once
more the same story. All this time the private party who
was injured by the criminal act bears the burden of his dam1
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age, unrelieved, subject to the peril that life or memory may
desert the witnesses. Furthermore, a considerable extra
expense must be borne by the state, in staging the duplicate
proceeding.
In most of continental Europe and in Latin American
countries, under the civil law system, codes expressly provide that when any person is injured by a crime he may
appear as a party in the criminal proceeding, make his claim
for restitution or damages, and have an adjudication.
In England, joinder of civil and criminal relief was the
regular and constant practice in Anglo-Saxon and Norman
times. Partly under romano-canonical influences, but really
more by accident than design, a general separation of civil
and criminal trials took place in the 1300's and 1400's. In
many instances, however, the typical English device of joinder continued, some to die out along with the actions to
which they were attached and others to continue active
down to the present day.
In the United States, English types of joint proceedings
continued in varying forms in most of the states which had
been colonies. The post-colonial states, including Indiana,
arose and were organized under new influences, chiefly the
jurisprudence of conceptions of the 1800's. It was conceived that perfect schemes of law could be evolved, placed
in definite grooves and pigeon-holes, and there remain forever.
Analysis was a fetish, a pioneer society was not
crowded with litigation, so analysis used the logically nice
scheme of wholly separate civil and criminal trials.
Are there any instances of mixed civil-criminal proceedings in Indiana? Let us examine the Indiana law, using as
topic headings the cases of mixed relief which exist today
in England.

JOINDER OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RELIEF
PUNITIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

Often the plaintiff in a civil suit is given as one item of
damages, over and above his actual injury, a sum assessed
as a punishment to the defendant and a warning to others.
This is a common law device, and exists as such in Indiana
without reduction to statutory form, except as part of some
special statutes. Such punitive and exemplary sums are
criminal in purpose; extra gain to the civil plaintiff is only
incidental to the primary aim of relief to society. Therefore, if the defendant did not act maliciously or with wanton recklessness there is no need to punish him or warn
others, and it is not proper in a civil trial to allow punitive
damages.' But where malice or wanton recklessness are
proven, the award of punitive damages has been upheld in
many decisions 3 and several dicta.4 For example, in an
action for breach of a guardian's bond punitive damages
may be assessed against the guardian whose breach offends
society,5 but not against the innocent sureties on the bond.'
2 Morford v. Woodworth, 7 Ind. 83 (1855); Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Shanks, 94 Ind. 598 (1883); Vandalia R. Co. v. Topping, 62 Ind. App. 657, 113
N. E. 421 (1916).
3 Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156 (1858) (slander); Millison v. Hoch, 17 Ind.
227 (1861) (fraud in inducing sale); Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116
(1871) ($1,000 for wrongful eviction from train); Zeigler v. Powell, 54 Ind.
173 (1876) (malicious prosecution); Farman v. Lauman, 73 Ind. 568 (1881)
(false imprisonment); Lake Erie Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 38 (1882) (wrongful eviction
from train); Citizens' R. Co. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563 (1893) (assault by servant
of a corporation); Atkinson v. Van Cleave, 25 Ind. App. 508, 57 N. E. 731
(1900) (malicious prosecution); Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N. E. 875
(1902) (false imprisonment); Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, 44 Ind. App.

375, 89 N. E. 403 (1909). (assault by servants of corporation); Indiana Union
Co. v. Heller, 44 Ind. App. 385, 89 N. E. 419 (1909) (failure to pick up interurban car passenger); Wheatcraft v. Myers, 57 Ind. App. 371, 107 N. E. 81
(1914) (fraudulent inducement in sale); Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan,
64 Ind. App. 268, 113 N. E. 1019 (1916) (assault by servants of corporation).
4 Anthony v. Gilbert, 4 Blackf. 348 (1837)
(trespass); Moore v. Crose,
43 Ind. 30 (1873) (trespass) ; Meyer v. Bohlfing, 44 Ind. 238 (1873) (slander) ;
Binford v. Young, 115 Ind. 174 (1888) (slander); American Sand Co. v. Spencer,
55 Ind. App. 523, 103 N. E. 426 (1913)

(trespass).

5 Colburn v. State, ex rel., 47 Ind. 310 (1874) (dictum).
6 Peelle v. State, ex rel., 118 Ind. 512, 21 N. E. 288 (1S88).
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In most states, punitive damages in a civil action are not
barred by the fact that the act of the defendant is a crime,
punishable in a criminal proceeding. In Indiana, however,
the criminal aspect of such damages has been deemed so
strong, even though awarded in a civil action, that they are
considered to constitute a criminal trial, and so are wholly
barred if the acts which give rise to the civil action are
punishable in a formal criminal proceeding.7 In the earlier
Indiana cases, this rule was considered to be a limitation on
the courts, based on the constitutional provision against
double jeopardy. Then in 1877, in Koerner v. Oberly,8
the constitutional rule was held to make void an express
legislative provision for punitive damages in a civil action
when such action was based on a criminal act, even though
no criminal proceeding had been filed and so no first jeopardy had occurred. This peculiar Indiana restriction disregards the fundamental purpose of punitive damages.
They are designed to accomplish civil and criminal relief in
one suit instead of two, saving the time and expense of
parties, witnesses, and the public machinery of justice.
They provide the punitive and exemplary elements in the
7 Decisions: Taber v. Huston, 5 Ind. 322 (1854) (assault); Struble v.
Nodwift, 11 Ind. 64 (1858) (wrongful liquor sales to son); Butler v. Mercer,
14 Ind. 479 (1860) (malicious trespass); Nossaman v. Rickert, 18 Ind. 350
(1862) (trespass to person) ; Humphries v. Johnson, 20 Ind. 190 (1863) (trespass
in a riot); Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877) (wrongful liquor sales to
husband); Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51 (1878) (false imprisonment by 3 or
more persons); Schafer v. Smith, 63 Ind. 226 (1878) (wrongful liquor sales to
husband); Skufakiss v. Duray, 85 Ind. App. 426, 154 N. E. 289 (1926).
Dicta, where exemplary damages affirmed: Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156 (1858)
slander); Millison v. Hoch, op. cit. supra note 3; Zeigler V. Powell, 54 Ind. 173
(1876)

(malicious prosecution); Farman v. Lauman, op. cit supra note 3; State,

ex rel., v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55, 2 N. E. 214 (1885) (illegal fee by official) ; Atkinson
v. Van Cleave, op. cit. supra note 3 (malicious prosecution); Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, op. cit. supra note 3 (action against corporation for assault
by its servants).
Dicta, in other cases: Meyer v. Bohlfing, op. cit. supra note 4; Wolf v.
Trinkle, 103 Ind. 355, 3 N. E. 110 (1885) (indecent assault); Wabash R. Co.
v. Crumrine, 123 Ind. 89, 21 N. E. 904 (1889) (libel); Tracy v. Hacket,
19 Ind. App. 133, 49 N. E. 185 (1898); Anderson v. Evansville Assoc., 49 Ind.
App. 403, 97 N. E. 445 (1911)
8 56 Ind. 284 (1877).

(deceit).
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frequent instances of petty social offenses which will never
be made the object of formal criminal proceedings, even
though subject to such prosecution. They are a substitute
to avoid for minor offenders the stigma of a criminal trial,
a result considered very valuable by modem penology.
In most of the Indiana decisions which have refused punitive damages when a crime is involved, no criminal action
had been brought when the civil case came to trial, and
the lapse of time indicated that none would be brought later.
Therefore the courts frequently have permitted them in
such cases under the guise of compensation for humiliation
and mental suffering. 9 In a case in which the servants of a
corporation had committed a serious and malicious assault,
the Supreme Court upheld an instruction under which punitive damages were assessed against the corporation, saying
nothing about the fact that the act involved was a crime. 0
In following this decision, the Appellate Court has explained
the point on the ground that the defendant corporation is
not liable, under Indiana law, to criminal prosecution for an
assault and battery by its servants. 1
It is unfortunate that Indiana has restricted the usefulness of punitive and exemplary damages. Judges and prosecuting officers with a proper understanding of their purpose should be able to use them frequently as a substitute
for a criminal trial. As it is, sometimes punishment is
never imposed and sometimes it is accomplished only by the
wastefulness of a second separate trial.
STATUTORY PENALTIES

There are many instances of deeds which offend the public but are not easily learned of by regular officials. An
9 E. g., Lake Erie Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381 (1882); Wolf v. Trinkle, 103
Ind. 355, 3 N. E. 110 (1885).
10 Citizens' R. Co. v. Willoeby, op. cit. supra note 3.
11 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, 44 Ind. App. 375, 89 N. E. 403 (1909);
Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, op. cit. supra note 3.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

ancient device to fill this gap has been to define an offense
by statute and provide that the party aggrieved by the
wrong may recover, beyond or in lieu of actual damages, a
set penalty, in an action sometimes civil in form and sometimes filed by a public officer on relation. Such statutes
appeared in England in the 14th and 15th centuries,"2 and
continued in the 16th and 17th centuries,' 3 scanty police
organizations making necessary the encouragement of private prosecutions. England also produced a number of
these statutes in the 19th century, many of them being
still in force today. Well organized systems of police have
partly removed the old reason for punishment through penalties, but new reasons have become visible. For one thing,
petty offenses still are known in many instances only to the
injured party, and the sureness of their punishment in England is due in no small degree to penalties assessed under
a private prosecution. For another thing, modern court
calendars are crowded, and time and money are saved for
all concerned when private and public relief are tried and
considered in a single action.
This penalty device, based on reasons closely akin to those
behind punitive damages, has been put to very little use in
Indiana. The law of this state was formed in the 1800's,
when the rigid and rule-bound pigeon-holing of analytical
and historical jurisprudence was in full sway. An orderly
scheme of justice looked much neater with a clear separation
of civil and criminal trials. An act of 1852 "4gave the aggrieved sender of a telegram a penalty, irrespective of actual
damage, for improper delay by the telegraph company. 15
This provision has been recognized as a combination of civil
and criminal relief, as the plaintiff can recover his actual
12 I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 452, 453.
13 IV HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 355-35, 512, 513.
14 REV. STAT. or 1881, § 4176, amended by ACTs OF 1885, p. 151; IND.
ANN. STAT. (Bums, 1894) §§ 5511, 5512.

15

See Hadley v. Western Union Co., 115 Ind. 191, 15 N. E. 845 (1888).
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proven damages and get the penalty as an additional sum,
the former being civil relief and the latter punishment of
an offense to the public. 6 The Indiana Appellate Court,
however, has voiced a hostility to such statutes, saying that
where an act is made a crime by statute "a second enactment in the nature of a penal or qui tam statute should not
be so construed as to bring the act constituting the crime
or offense within the purview thereof, unless by express
terms it is so provided." "
Another penalty statute was enacted in 1885,8 in protection of negroes discriminated against by denial of service
in an inn, h6tel or other place of public accomodation. Although little used, the statute is still in force. 9 A judgment
under it for a negro plaintiff was sustained in Fruchey v.
Eagleson.2"

Another penalty statute which is still in force is aimed at
extortion of illegal fees by public officials. 2 ' The state, on
the relation of the aggrieved individual, brings an action on
the bond of the erring official, and the court awards the
relator a penalty of five times the illegal fee collected."
Another Indiana statute prescribes that if a man marries
a woman to avoid proceedings for seduction or bastardy, to
which he is subject, and abandons her within two years, he
is guilty of fraud and subject to a penalty of not less than
$200.3 Some cases have stated that this statute is civil and
16 See Western Union Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 37, 60 N. E. 679 (1901),
voicing this view in affirming assessment of a penalty.
17 Western Union Co. v. Bierhaus, 8 Ind. App. 563, 36 N. E. 161 (1893),
holding wrongful disclosure of contents of a telegram to be outside of the
penalty statute.
18 AcTS or 1885, p. 76; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1894) §§ 3291, 3293.
19 IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§4633-4635.
20 15 Ind. App. 88, 43 N. E. 146 (1895).
21 REv. STAT. oF 1881, § 6031; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 12098.
22 See State, ex rel., v. Stevens, op. cit. supra note 7.
23 AcTs or 1895, p. 167; IND. ANN. STAT. (Bums, 1901) § 7298a; IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 9885-9888.
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remedial, as the penalty goes to the woman aggrieved.'
It is to be noted, however, that the action is brought in the
name of the state and by the public prosecutor. Furthermore, the court must assess at least $200, even though the
woman proves no damage at all. 5 The statutory action,
therefore, is obviously penal as well as remedial.
PEACE RECOGNIZANCES

A recognizance or bond, with or without sureties, has
many uses, the commonest being as bail to insure the state
that one charged with crime will appear. The protection
of society alone is here involved.
A recognizance to keep the peace, however, is a definite
combination of social and private protection. On complaint of a person in fear of wrongful injury to person or
property, justices of the peace had an ancient common law
power, bolstered by statutes, to arrest the offender, order
him to provide a bond to keep the peace for a specified
period, and jail him if such bond was not provided.2" The
complaint was called "exhibiting articles of peace." The
threatened wrong was a breach of the peace and so a crime,
as well as a civil offense, so in the single proceeding private
protection and preventive criminal justice were both accomplished.
Such recognizances to keep the peace appear early in the
Indiana statutes, as a power of both circuit courts and justices of the peace."
The statutory phrases were general,
merely reciting the common law. By 1894 some details had
been added; the justice issuing the recognizance was required to send the case to the circuit court for trial of the
issue whether the complainant was reasonably in fear, the
24 Latshaw v. State, ex rel., 156 Ind. 194 (1901); State, ex rel., v. Lannoy,
30 Ind. App. 335, 65 N. E. 1052 (1903).
25 State, ex rel., v. Richeson, 36 Ind. App. 373, 75 N. E. 846 (1905).
26 See 4 BL. COMM., c. 18; STAT. 34 EDW. III (1360) c. 1; STAT. 3 HrN.
VII (1487) c. 3; STAT. 21 JAC. I (1623) c. 8, § 1.
27 See IND. REv. LAWS o
1831, c. 22, § 4, and c. 54, § 1; IN). REV. LAWS
oF 1838, c. 23, § 4, and c. 58, § 1.
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action was required to be in the name of the state, and the
recognizance was required to protect the peace of the public
in general and the complainant in particular.2" With some
formal additions of 1905, this statute has remained the same
to the present day.29
Peace recognizances on combined complaints by the state
and a private relator have had considerable use, and while
the details of the law were being worked out they produced
many decisions in the higher courts.80 It has been held that
the proceeding is sufficiently criminal to prevent costs under
a statute assessing them against a losing civil plaintiff;"' to
authorize use of criminal practice; 2 to prevent appeal by
the state; 83 and to require the circuit court to put it on the
criminal docket."1 On the other hand, the action has been
held sufficiently civil to void the constitutional provision
against double jeopardy; 8" to prevent application of a statute giving circuit courts original jurisdiction in criminal matters;"5 and to prevent application of the doctrine of reasonable doubt or the rule making juries judges of both law and
See IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1894) §§ 1675-1686.
29 See AcTs op 1905, p. 584; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1914) §§ 1910-1922;
IN. ANm. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 2072-2084.
80 State v. Abrams, 4 Blackf. 440 (1837); Steel& v. State, ex rel., 4 Ind.
561 (1853) ; Conklin v. State, ex rel, 8 Ind. 458 (1857) ; State, ex rel., v. Bridegroom, 10 id. 170 (1858); Long v. State, ex rel., 10 Ind. 353 (1858); Collins
v. State, ex rel., 11 Ind. 312 (1858); State, ex rel., v. Maners, 16 Ind. 175
(1861); State, ex rel., v. Long, 18 Ind. 438 (1862); Beckwith v. State, ex rel.,
21 Ind. 225 (1863); Murray v. State, 26 Ind. 141 (1866); State v. Vankirk,
27 Ind. 121 (1866); Deloohery v. State, 27 Ind. 521 (1867); State, ex rel., v.
Sayer, 35 Ind. 379 (1871); State, ex rel., v. Steward, 48 Ind. 146 (1874);
Fisher v. Hamilton, 49 Ind. 341 (1874); State v. Rudowsky, 65 Ind. 389 (1879);
State v. Carey, 66 Ind. 72 (1879); State v. Cooper, 90 Ind. 575 (1883); Arnold
v. State, 92 Ind. 187 (1883); Stone v. State, ex rel., 97 Ind. 345 (1884); Davis
v. State, 138 Ind. 11, 37 N. E. 397 (1893); State v. Tow, 5 Ind. App. 261, 31
N. E. 1120 (1892).
31 State v. Abrams, 4 Black!. 440 (1837).
32 State, ex rel., v. Maners, op. cit supra note 30.
33 State, ex rel., v. Long, op. cit. supra note 30.
34 State v. Carey, op. cit. supra note 30.
35 State v. Vankirk, op. cit. supra note 30:
36 State v. Cooper, op. cit. supra note 30.
28
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fact in criminal trials." Of course the truth of the matter is
that the proceeding is both civil and criminal, and the courts
have found it necessary to work out a reasonable set of rules
appropriate to such a joinder.
At common law peace recognizances were also used when
the threatened crime had actually been committed and the
offender convicted. To protect the public and the party
aggrieved from a repetition of the offense, a peace bond
might be required in addition to or in lieu of other punishment. This is now the law in Indiana, since 1905, where
the offense is not punishable by death or confinement in the
state's prison. 8 This device is very useful where the criminal court grants probation, or punishes only by a fine.
If the bond for public and private protection is not given,
the court can put the offender safely in jail.
BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS

A very common instance of civil and criminal relief in a
single trial is the bastardy proceeding. Although at early
common law the father of a bastard child had no legal
duties, 9 it was soon realized that society was offended by
the immoral act and that there ought to be a civil duty to
support the child. These two ideas were combined in the
Stat. 13 Eliz. (1576) c. 3, s. 2, and carried on in England

by several subsequent enactments.
Bastardy statutes have existed for a long time in Indiana.4" The proceeding has two plaintiffs, the state and the
relator. The Indiana courts have indulged in the general
37 Arnold v. State, op. cit. supra note 30; Davis v. State, op. cit. supra
note 30.
38 ACTS oF 1905, p. 584; IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 2348.

39
40
1070.

STAT.

(Burns, 1914)

§ 2181; IND. ANN.

BASTARDS, 7 C. J. 955, note 95.
The present law is contained in IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)

§§

1049-
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statement that the action is civil. It has been held, however, that the action is void if the prosecuting attorney was
not notified and the state was not a real party.41 It has
been held also that the relatrix is not the sole plaintiff,42 nor
even a civil plaintiff.4 The truth of the matter is that
fathering and non-support of a bastard child are offenses
against the state, to be expiated in a special manner, as well
as being the source of a civil duty.
NON-SUPPORT PROCEEDINGS

In a quite recent series of statutes, the Indiana legislature
has provided expressly for the use of criminal proceedings
to accomplish civil relief. These statutes involve non-support of a wife, children, or parent, and in purpose are closely
akin to bastardy proceedings.
By Acts of 1913, p. 956, and Acts of 1915, p. 654, wilful
neglect of a child under fourteen years of age, by a parent
charged with support, is a felony punishable by a sentence
of one to seven years. But after indictment and conviction "the judge may suspend the sentence and, in the order
suspending the sentence, may require the defendant to pay,
weekly or otherwise, as the court may determine, to the
clerk of the court, for the support of the children, such
sum as the court may deem necessary." 11 If the defendant
fails to pay as ordered, he may be arrested, and the suspension revoked or continued as a lever on behalf of civil relief to the children. The criminal court may even go so
far as to order the defendant's debtor to make payments to
Gooding v. State, 39 Ind. App. 42, 78 N. E. 257 (1906).
22 Ind. App. 383, 53 N. E. 850 (1899), under a
Dehler v. State, ex rel.,
statute requiring infant sole plaintiffs to use a next friend.
43 Ex parte Haase, 50 Ind. 149 (1875), under a statute requiring release of
a defendant jailed on civil process when costs of imprisonment are not paid
by plaintiff.
44 IND. ANx. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 2867.
41

42
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the court out of the defendant's wages, earnings or income,
performance of the order constituting payment to the defendant."5
By Acts of 1915, p. 139,4 failure of a husband to support
a wife or child is made a misdemeanor. Before or after the
criminal trial, the criminal court is empowered to require the
defendant to give a bond assuring proper support, and on
forfeiture under the bond the sum recovered by the state
can be applied by the court to the support of the wife or
children. If the defendant is imprisoned, the court may
order that he be put to work on public works of the county,
his earnings to go to the wife or children.
By Acts of 1921, p. 90, 17 if a person who is of age, and
able, fails to support his parents, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. The criminal court may suspend judgment, after
conviction, on condition that such payments of support as
the court shall direct will be paid.
By Acts of 1925, p. 287, when a man is imprisoned, after
conviction of the crime of desertion of his wife or children,
the trustees of the prison are required to give him productive work, and pay his wages to the clerk of the criminal
court for the use of the wife or children.
All of these statutes are part of a new and frank legislative admission that there is nothing wrong, indeed that
there is wisdom, in using criminal courts and criminal proceedings in aid of prompt civil relief. This embodies and
regularizes an old practice of many local prosecuting attorneys, who have not hesitated to lend their time and pressure to aggrieved persons who have been injured by a
crime.
45

46
47

(Burns, 1926) § 2869.
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 2870-2874.
IND. ANI. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 2875-2876.
IND. ANN. STAT.
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NuIsANcEs

Technically, public actions for public nuisances and private actions for private nuisances have been separated
strictly in Indiana, as elsewhere. In many instances, however, a public nuisance is specially offensive and injurious
to a private person. Instead of bearing the expense and delay of a civil suit, the private person sometimes instigates
a criminal action by the state, a resultant abatement giving
relief to him as well as to the public.48 No case has ever
arisen in Indiana in which the private person expressly
joined as plaintiff in the public action, seeking his damages.
Such a joinder would certainly save the expense of two suits
arising out of the very same facts, and failure to attempt
it is a matter of habit rather than of any express legal prohibition. Might it be done successfully? It has been allowed in England by judicial decision, without the aid of
any statute.4
FORCIBLE ENTRY OR DETAINER

At common law, a criminal court trying a prosecution for
forcible entry or detainer might order restoration of possession to the civil party. The Indiana statutes are silent
on this matter, defining the criminal and civil actions in
separate sections.50 The section concerning the civil action
shows that force is necessary, so it rests on exactly the same
facts and elements as constitute the crime. As a matter of
fact, the criminal action is practically unused, for lack of
complaints by the parties aggrieved; they have no reason
48 See Armfield v. State, 27 Ind. App. 488, 61 N. E. 693 (1901), containing
a dictum that injury to a single individual will support an indictment for a
statutory nuisance.
49 Attorney-General v. Logan (18911 L. R. 2 Q. B. 100. See also Caldwell
v. Pagham Harbour Co. [1876] L. R. 2 Ch. D. 221.
50 IND. ANx. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 2488 (crime), and § 9570 (civil action).
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for instigating an action in which they can get nothing. The
result is that commission of the crime goes practically unpunished.
RESTITUTION OF STOLEN GOODS

It was an ancient common law practice to order the return
of stolen goods to the owner, on conviction of the thief in a
criminal trial. This power of the criminal court has been
developed by statutes, and continues in England down to
the present day. Several of our American states use this
device, but the Indiana statutes and decisions are silent
about it and show no attempts at its use. There is no good
reason why the wronged party should not be able to appear
in the criminal trial, and, when a conviction proves him to
be the true owner of goods gotten by larceny, robbery or
false pretences, get a court order of restitution of such property as has been seized or is findable. Furthermore, if his
property is not recovered, the court ought to be able to
enter a judgment for damages in his favor, for the proof
has been beyond a reasonable doubt and a second separate
trial is a sheer waste of time and money.
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

The Indiana law on peace recognizances is in good shape,
and the same is true of bastardy and non-support proceedings. In a single action, whether the form be civil or criminal, both public and private needs and interests are recognized and protected.
The restricted use of statutory penalties may perhaps be
wise. They are very useful in securing prosecution of petty
offenses, and have a real value in reaching first offenders
without attaching the stigma of a criminal prosecution. This
is their use in England, where second offenses are made more
serious and are prosecuted criminally. On the other hand,
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a penalty attached to a civil suit for damages might encourage trumped-up cases and malicious prosecutions. The
remedy for this danger is to permit the court to give damages to the defendant against the plaintiff, without a crosscomplaint, if the prosecution proves to be malicious, as is the
rule in most civil law systems of continental Europe and
Latin America. This question is worthy of serious consideration in connection with petty first offenders.
As to punitive damages, their effectiveness as a substitute for criminal prosecution is much weakened by the Indiana view that they cannot be given when the offense constitutes a crime. They usually arise in connection with
cases wherein a penal sum will be sufficient punishment and
warning, if no criminal prosecution has actually been
started, and have the great advantage of assuring punishment without the waste and expense of a duplicate separate
action.
The greatest weakness in Indiana law is in regard to
nuisances, stolen goods, and civil injuries arising from criminal operations of public conveyances and motor vehicles.
In every criminal trial on these matters, there is much to
say in favor of allowing the party or parties aggrieved to
appear and claim restitution or damages. Conversely, in
civil trials on these matters the prosecuting attorney ought
to be able to appear if he deems it necessary for the public
interest.
Consider, also, the Indiana statute which prescribes a fine
of from value to double value, in a criminal trial, against a
hunter who negligently or maliciously injures animals or
property. What of the owner of the property? He must
seek redress in a separate civil action, long delayed and in
most cases costing him more than he will get by way of damages and costs. Why not let him appear in the criminal
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proceeding, and when the fine has been assessed let him receive out of it his damages?
Although we have ventured generalized recommendations,
it is realized that there are many obstacles. We are not
ignorant of questions raised by such things as trial by jury
and rules of procedure. This article is a "trial balloon,"
as part of a long and interesting research which is still pending. In part it is a collection of unique materials for the
bench and bar of Indiana, but in part it is an attempt to
reach them for their suggestions and criticisms, drawn from
cases or statutes or from their own experiences. Communications sent to the editor of the Notre Dame Lawyer will
be received with appreciation.
Felix Forte.
Boston University, School of Law.

